776 kingdom. The hyena ("jeb") is regarded as acting sometimes as the
825 "horse" of the evil spirit or human sorcerer, sometimes as a werewolf-like creature, when the evil spirit or human sorcerer assumes its form at night, or makes use of its powerful, hypnotic eyes to "draw the
[755] blood" magically from the living victim. The concept of the magical hyena is much used in diagnosis and treatment of mental ailments. It is the most common wild animal, seen and heard at night, and the holes it burrows under fresh human graves are regarded as visible evidence of the character of the hyena. The fear in which the spiritual world is held is symbolized in the hyena; it is whispered about in connection with suspected ethnic craft groups such as the smiths; or shouted out loud in military unison ("yabahalal jebo") in challenge.

825 Aspects of the animal world which cause great "wonderment" among homespun Amhara "shemagalye" philosophers are types of animal behavior that seem so human. "Bird language" is given a variety of popular interpretations (footnote 102). Baboons, which are a constant annoyance and therefore familiar, are wondered about in part because of their human-like social organization headed by "great man" chiefs ("[illegible]").

But it is a great insult to call a person a "creature of Thursday" (when animals were created, according to the Bible).

186 B. Amhara Ideas about Human Races and Amhara Ethnocentrism.

829 The dualism of the Amhara culture pattern rules also their view of the human races with which they are familiar, and their own

Footnote 102 - Leslau: Popular Interpretations of Bird Sounds in Ethiopia. Journal of American Folklore, 1952, Vol. 65, pp. 361-4.

186 ethnocentrism: "We" includes the brunette racial features of the
829 Mediterranean world, particularly if accompanied by Abyssinian-Coptic religion, for to the Amhara the name "Amhara" is synonymous with Christianity of their own denomination. "They", in their mind, refers to the black peoples of Africa whom they enslaved; but also to "infidel", particularly the Muslims with whom they have been at war so often. They draw many lines within these major ethnocentric divisions, racial, religious, ethnic-occupational and linguistic.. But, in the Amhara attitude, racial differences are among the most fundamental.

829 The skin color of most Amhara is regarded by them as brown
822 ("t̄aym"), considered better looking than the black of negroid peoples, and reflecting "better character". Black color is regarded as symbolic of anything unpleasant, spiritually impure, ("t̄aqqorā" connotes "he became shadowed, sad, depressed"). It is a (mild) insult to call a very dark person "t̄aqqwara" (lit. "darkie"). European skin color is regarded as "red" ("k̄ay") - a common African attitude. The concept of "white" coloring connotes paleness ("n̄atta" (lit. he became pale), undernourishment, sickness, insipid weakness.

822 Color symbolism is followed in dress: The Amhara wear white
291 togas, without coloring more than the border, because the concept white also connotes spiritual purity (by extension of the concept of the absence of physical strength). Yellow ("w̄yba") is the traditional color of special mourning, worn only by monastic monks who regard themselves as in a state of perpetual mourning for the passing of Christ from the earth (the dye is made from the bark of the "w̄yba" tree, hence the name). Green and blue are collectively called "ar̄āngwadē", and are not sharply differentiated.

826 Racial ideas also dominate the Amhara concepts of physical

152 554 158 on the ground, Amhara noblewomen weep silently or go into states of apathy. This is a more common mental ailment among nobles than hysteria, and may lead to chronic depression and even catalepsy (see Part VI).

157 554 186 However, both the peasant and the noble share certain common Amhara personality characteristics. Both take great pride in being able to "speak well in court". Homesickness is strong among both, and is very widespread. Kings and emperors, until very recently, had great difficulty in sending and keeping ambassadors abroad, for the diplomat regarded his foreign assignment as "exile". Both classes share great pride in their highland plateau, defended for many centuries against all comers. This national vanity is at least in part due to long ignorance of the world beyond (sometimes hardened into xenophobia); pride in their ancient religion and in the national epics like the Solomon-Sheba-Menelik. These are shared by Amhara of all classes.

829 Amhara concepts of government administration are aristocratic: ruled by the noble "great man", who is usually descended from a feudal warlord of past centuries. The military camp and its direct significance for traditional Amhara social structure and government has been described in Part III. At the top of the hierarchy is the king or emperor (King of Kings). At the Amhara grassroots is the peasant, who seeks justice by attaching himself to a "great man" as retainer, so that he too will be treated "with honor" by reflection. From the bottom to the top of the hierarchy of government, persons on every level perform the ceremony of "dai tenat" (lit. waiting by the gate) to obtain jobs, maintain positions, or merely to prevent doubts about personal loyalty from arising through absence. This

829 pattern continues in full force even at present. As a result, the high official is as hesitant about delegating authority downward (which might build up a potential rival), as the inferior in the hierarchy fears to accept delegated authority (lest the superior repent of his grant and suspect rebellion). In consequence, daily problems, even routine ones, are regularly referred for decision to the superior in the hierarchy of government.

812 The authoritarian "literalness" which characterizes so many Amhara attitudes may at least in part be the effect of religious fundamentalism. Until recently, the "Fetha Nagast" criminal and [681] civil code was literally enforced, including the cutting off of hands for theft and of feet for rebellion. Biblical passages are interpreted literally, by the priests. In monasteries, the monks exclude the presence of even female animals such as cows.

[779] The church, sacerdotal in its concepts and rituals, does not feel that it owes an explanation to anyone; and "literalness" has remained unchallenged (except during the relatively brief Portuguese episode). In the Amhara view, there is a direct and unilateral connection between cause and effect, and paradoxes that result from such oversimplifications are ignored: e.g. the tallest obelisk at Aksum, which has fallen and broken into several large pieces, is claimed to have been "pushed" over by the Falasha Queen Judith, despite the fact that another, almost as tall, still stands nearby. [682] Homicide, especially if accidental, is blamed on the "zanyēn" spirits who pushed the murderer's hand.

647 Literal obedience dominates the governmental administration, for no subordinate would arrogate to himself the privilege of "interpret" the spirit of the law handed down by the official of superior status.

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

Amhara invention. Though exact documentation is not available on the matter, *qenē* appears to be one of the flowers of the literary renascence which took place during the centuries following the ascendance of the Solomonid Dynasty. The earliest specimens of *qenē* extant date back to the reign of Emperor Eskender (1478–94).[6] Ethiopian traditions trace the invention of *qenē* to the work of a man named Tawānay, who is said to have lived in Gojjam in the fourteenth century.[7] The important schools of *qenē* have always been located in Amhara country, primarily at the monasteries of Wādelā, Wāsharā, and Gonj in Gojjam Province. While the choristers of Tigre have long since mastered the canons of *qenē* composition in Ge'ez, the use of wax and gold in the vernacular occurs much more often in Amharic than in Tigrinya. Indeed, wax and gold is so important in Amharic that some Amhara maintain that one does not properly speak the language unless he is well versed in the art of exploiting its numerous ambiguities. One of the more common indictments of Tigre character by Amhara is that the Tigre are "dry" (*daraq*); they say just what they feel and do not know how to be ambiguous. Conversely, many Tigre as well as other non-Amhara people in the empire complain about the excess of symbolism and subtlety in Amhara discourse.

Educated Amhara traditionalists extol wax and gold as a unique creation of their culture. One of them has written that *qenē* is as distinctive of Ethiopia's spiritual culture as *tēff*, a species of grass grown as a cereal grain only in Ethiopia, is distinctive of her material culture.[8] They further maintain that Ge'ez *qenē* contains a unique kind of wisdom, dark and deep. Instruction in this occult art of verse composition has traditionally been regarded as propaedeutic to the study of religious texts.* Partly this is because Ge'ez grammar, which must be known in order to understand these texts, is normally taught only in the schools of *qenē*. The more philosophical reason given, however, is that by affording exercise in fathoming secrets it "opens the mind" and thereby enhances the student's ability to approach the divine mysteries.

Important as such functions may be in the high culture of Ethiopia, wax and gold represents more than a principle of poetic composition and a method of spiritual gymnastics for a small class of literati. The ambiguity symbolized by the formula *sam-ennā warq* colors the entire fabric of traditional Amhara life. It patterns the speech and outlook of every Amhara. When he talks, his

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* The course of instruction in *qenē* takes from two to five years, according to the talent of the student and the degree of mastery he desires. Ge'ez grammar and *qenē* prosody are taught side by side. The former, usually studied in the evening, is learned by rote. The latter is taught by running the student step by step through the gamut of figures and stanza forms. Instruction by example begins in the dark, before sunrise. The teacher extemporizes on a given theme in each of the stanza forms. His productions are memorized and discussed. In the daytime each student goes off by himself to a secluded place and composes one stanza. When finished—it may take him all day to perfect a couplet—he recites it to the master, who makes appropriate critical comments.

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streets, "he salutes him with his left hand, which is a mark of contempt."[41] The Falasha, potters and metalsmiths of Judaic faith, were similarly segregated, and plied their arts and crafts in another quarter.

Though many different peoples came together in Gondar, and though it was a meeting-point of trade routes from the Sudan, the Red Sea ports, and the African interior, Gondar's cultural role was not primarily that of a melting pot of diverse traditions. It served rather as an agent for the quickened development of the Amhara's own culture.[42] And thus it became a focus of national pride. The countryfolk looked on Gondar not as a hotbed of alien custom and immorality, as they often regard Addis Ababa today, but as the most perfect and advanced embodiment of their own traditional values.

The Gondarē himself, as denizen of this second Jerusalem, was prouder still. A snobbish pride became one of the conspicuous marks of Gondarē character. This pride is manifest in many ways. On the one hand, it appears as incorrigible vanity. Hence arise the many caricatures of the Gondarē—as one who goes hungry in order to purchase fine clothes in which to strut about, or as one who satisfied his hunger at home before going out in order not to appear needy at his host's table. (Perhaps the most famous of the stories about the Gondarē is the one about the man who spent the night naked and shivering because, for form's sake, he hung up his only garment as a curtain about himself.) On the other hand, Gondarē pride appears as the immense dignity with which the Gondarē carries himself, his sensitivity to the nuances of personal relations, his choice use of the Amharic language, his noble bearing. If there is a polarity in Gondarē life comparable to the Manzē polarity of bravery versus aggression, it is pride versus vanity.

Gondar's role as political and cultural capital of the nation for so long produced two other distinctive aspects of the Gondarē ethos. One is the love of *shumat*, or political appointments. Despite the unfortunate denouement of the Gondar monarchy, Gondar's importance as chief administrative center for such a long period had a deep influence on the ways of the people. "Give the Gondarē any office whatsoever," it is said, "and no matter what the salary, he will be happy."

The Gondarē's love of *shumat* is expressed in two phenomena which contrast strikingly with their Manzē counterparts. In the naming of children, the Gondarē prefers names which express an ambition for political honors, such as *Makonnen*, meaning "nobleman," and *Negusē* ("my king"). Furthermore, litigation in Gondar is characteristically concerned with disputes regarding *mādariyā*, land which has been given as an award for service to the government, as well as with disputes over *rĭst*.

The other prominent aspect of Gondar's ethos relates to its position as the center of Ethiopia's Christian literati. The fact that it was the ecclesiastical capital of the country is not the most important consideration here. Of course,

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flux of many Muslims and Galla, a migration favored by its urban situation. Manz, surrounded by hostile Galla, was forced for survival to cultivate its fighting powers, and for ultimate security to reconquer the surrounding areas. It was aided in this by whatever special geographical and cultural factors helped to produce the peculiarly militant and defiant character of the Manzē. But because of the annihilation of most of Shoa's churches and monasteries in the sixteenth century, and the isolation of Manz from the renascence of Amhara culture at Gondar, it was left illiterate and culturally impoverished. Its religious life remained limited to a narrow adherence to the ritual requirements of Ethiopian Christianity.

The dispersion of the Solomonic line over the several provinces was thus accompanied by the formation of distinct mores for Manz and Gondar. There is evidence that the differences were quite pronounced by the early nineteenth century. Just a few years before the fierce inhabitants of Manz sped to the rescue of Sāhla Selassie against the rebel Matako, Gondar was similarly threatened by a rebel band under a man named Mersu. Compare Rüppell's account of the behavior of the Gondarēs:

> In this general alarm the pitifulness of the local inhabitants was all too conspicuous. Far from uniting to defend their property with arms against the dreaded plunder—which would have been easy, in as much as there were at least four hundred rifles in Gondar, while not a single one of Mersu's men possessed a firearm—instead they carried the rifles into the churches, in order to keep them from being plundered along with the other booty.[48]

The distinction between Manz and Gondar suggested here is drawn in terms of "ideal types"—generalized dispositions which will, of course, not be true in every case and which will be found elsewhere in Ethiopia to a greater or lesser degree. It is interesting to note that in their own stereotypes, Ethiopians tend to view the Manzēs as fighters, the Gondarēs as literati, but not vice versa. Thus, an officer of the Imperial Bodyguard who commanded Ethiopian troops in the Korean War has said:

> The Manzēs were excellent soldiers. They were independent, not so ready to obey commands as the Galla, but they had good ideas about fighting and were very brave in the battlefield. The soldiers from Gondar tended to be independent and insubordinate, too, but they were not very good soldiers, either.*

On the other hand, Ethiopians commonly consider Manz as much a land of the backward as they regard Gondar the home of the learned. Krapf observed

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* This stereotype of the Gondarē is combatted by Garimā Tāfara's book, *The Gondarē with His Shield* (*Gondarē Ba-Gāshāw* [Addis Ababa: Tasfā Gabra Selassie Press, 1957]), which records in great detail the contributions of individual Gondarēs to the fight against the enemy during the Italian occupation.

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over a century ago that the people of Manz had the reputation of being "brave, daring, and ignorant."[46] The caricatures of the typical Manzē usually have to do with his *qilnat* ("stupidity"), such as the old story about the Manzēs at the bottom of a hill who were warned about some rolling boulders and replied: "That's all right, we'll just put our heads under the blanket and then we won't see the stones." As one Manzē himself put it: "We look to Gondar as our older brother. We know we are ignorant and illiterate."

Although in each other's eyes the Gondarē may be arraigned as haughty and cowardly and the Manzē berated as ignorant and hostile, a comparative view enables one to see the differences between Manz and Gondar as complementary, representing a specialization of interest and function within a common culture. An Amhara priest expressed this idea to me by saying: "The people of Gondar and Manz are really the same. Only Gondar is the head, and Manz the foot." (In Amharic thought the leg symbolizes force.) The pursuit of different interests and the perfection of different functions led to the cultivation of different virtues and, by the same token, the indulgence of different faults. The result was what might be called a moral division of labor along a geographical axis.

The primary axis of this division of labor in Amhara culture was vocational. The separate virtues of soldier and cleric were cultivated through distinct roles, pursued part or full time by two different sets of individuals. This permitted both sets of values to be realized without arousing the cultural and psychic conflicts that would inhere in their joint cultivation by the same persons.

It was by historical accident that Manz and Gondar came to provide an additional axis for this division of labor. At Gondar, through the political circumstances described above, the military function withered away, while the religio-literary culture was enabled to flourish. In Manz, the latter was destroyed and never recovered, while the energies of her people were consumed in fighting.

The historical advantage of this was that the Amhara thereby found the occasion for a massive revitalization of their religious culture through the facilities at Gondar, yet were able to accumulate a military momentum, through the years of incubation in Manz, that favored a political comeback which put them in a position to assert their might over an area larger than ever before in Ethiopian history. The moral consequence was that the Gondarē and the Manzē developed in pronounced form the virtues of the literatus and the soldier, respectively. The total culture was perhaps thereby enriched. Alaqā Gabra Hānnā, cultivated literatus, was in a sense the epitome of the Gondarē ethos, just as Menelik II, determined fighter as well as shrewd politician and tactful diplomat, was morally as well as genealogically akin to the men of Manz. The imperial court at the end of the nineteenth century,

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643 571 right to a direct audience at any time. The Emperor is known to glow with pleasure when a subject with whom he is speaking reveals that he comes from Manz. The Manzēs, for their part, proudly refer to their area as *ya-negus agar* ("king's country"). They are perhaps the most devoted of all Ethiopians to the present Crown. However, many stories are told to show that this loyalty has not dissolved their intractable spirit. For example, when asked to select a representative for Ethiopia's first elected parliament in 1957, some of them were indignant: "We already have *our* representative in the capital, and if he isn't able to do the job himself, let him step down and hand it to somebody else."

871 658 Despite their expressed loyalty to Haile Selassie, the Manzēs stubbornly oppose the program with which he is publicly most associated and whose portfolio he has retained, as Minister of Education, from 1943 to the present day. The adults of Manz object to having their children attend the government schools. In many cases where a child has elected to attend school on his own, his parents have cut off all support. The four schools in Manz thus have [162] an enrolment far below capacity, totaling (as of 1960) less than four hundred in this area of perhaps fifty to sixty thousand families.[49] Those hardy youngsters who do attend school often do so in rags and with an empty stomach.

[857] One reason for this determined opposition to the government schools is the obvious economic one: children must stay at home to tend the herds. This is a problem all over rural Ethiopia, but still the schools in many other areas are overcrowded. Another reason is that, as we have seen, Manz was not interested in education in the old days. Few Manzēs learned to read in the church schools. When a boy showed unusual talent and interest in traditional studies he had to travel to Gondar, which often meant running away from Manz.

871 658 186 829 The crux of Manzē defiance of the new educational system, however, is cultural fundamentalism. The Manzēs keep their children away from the government schools because they fear that the students there are learning something that threatens the old ways. In particular, they do not like their children to learn the language of the *faranj* ("European") or to be exposed to Ethiopians who have been taught by *faranj* and thereby infected by alien ideas. Tending the farm, keeping the fasts, defending land and self—that is the sum and substance of Manzē education, beyond which there is nothing a boy needs to learn.

829 648 186 Undoubtedly part of this dread of *faranj* learning is based on the Manzēs' one experience with the white man: the Fascist occupation. As one of the strongholds of patriotic resistance to the occupation, Manz and the Manzēs became the object of the invader's unyielding fury. Over miles and miles of Manz not a home or church was spared. The inhabitants were either killed, or fled to safer areas in Galla country, or joined the underground opposition—

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in such numbers that "Manzē" virtually became a synonym for "underground patriot."

After the liberation, as after the routing of Ahmad Grāñ's forces, the Manzē once again returned to redeem a ravished land. Slowly, the houses were rebuilt, the land was plowed once more. Churches which had been rebuilt after Grāñ's destruction only to be razed by the Italians were again put into place. Tough in his spiritual as in his physical life, the Manzē doggedly re-established the culture of his own. Now as before the occupation, a man of Manz sits on the throne, promising to let no foreigner take his country's land,* while the young braves celebrate the royal line in their festive boasting:

Ya-Manz ababā, ya-Manz ababāl Yābbabāl genā!
The flower of Manz, the flower of Manz! It will bloom yet again!

The Legacy of Manz and Gondar

Thus far the significance of Manz and Gondar has been discussed from the point of view of an outsider. We have attempted to assess, on the basis of the best available evidence, the respective historical and cultural roles of these two noted Amhara regions. We turn now to a different though related question, namely, the significance of these two places in the minds and feelings of Ethiopians themselves.

Two kinds of reaction are conspicuous. To the Ethiopian Modernist, Manz and Gondar are seen primarily as outlying pockets of conservatism. Their commitments to the past move them to resist certain changes promoted by the national government, with Manz protesting modern education and Gondar defending itself against nationalist centralization. They are regarded as backward areas, representative of the many forces that are "holding Ethiopia back," and to a certain extent are disdained.

To their inhabitants, on the other hand, these places are objects of intense loyalty. For differences of identity among the Amhara are defined chiefly in terms of their *agar*, or "home country." The size of one's *agar* is relative; it depends on the context in which the symbol is used, and may be as small as a district or as large as a province. Whatever the referent, one's *agar* signifies more than a place of residence or provenience. It means "home," and all those whose families live there are regarded with special affection, while those out-

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* On certain festive occasions the following antiphonal chant is declaimed in praise of "Ṭaqel" (the affectionate, "horse" name of Haile Selassie):

[Leader:] *Min āla ṭaqel mīn āla?*
[Chorus:] *Agarē la-saw agarē la-saw alsṭem ala!*
[Leader:] What did Ṭaqel say, what did he say?
[Chorus:] "My country to outsiders, my country to outsiders, I will not give!" said he.

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liefs and values, (2) retention of the basic emotional tie and identification with the group in question, and (3) elaboration of the virtues of the group in terms of universalistic criteria.

This is a type of orientation to the primordial sentiments which has the effect of maximizing both traditional and modern values, for it retains the sources of security and identity provided by tradition yet defines them in ways that promote national solidarity and the creative resources of the national culture. It is an approach which may be illustrated, in concluding this chapter, by the cases of two modern-educated Amhara who identify themselves, in part, as a Manzē and a Gondarē.

"Balātchaw" is an American-educated official of the Ethiopian government. Born and raised in Addis Ababa, his family originated in Manz, and he still has relatives who reside there. He is an ardent modernizer, anxious to see progressive leadership and the expansion of educational facilities provided in the provinces; yet he is also very sentimental about Amhara traditions and, in particular, his *agar* Manz.

To Balātchaw, Manz symbolizes hard-core loyalty to blood and to land. It also symbolizes the will to fight stubbornly for one's rights and for what one thinks right. He sees the government's keen concern for its territorial boundaries as a direct reflection of the Manzē's determination to retain and acquire land. Balātchaw gets much pleasure out of telling stories about the Manzē's almost foolhardy bravery in combatting the Italian invader. He reveals a "clear consciousness of an inner identity" with the Manzē in this regard, and says of himself: "You know, even as a child, and ever since, I have not been afraid of anybody."

"Makonnen" is a government official who was trained in western Europe. His family lives in Gondar, though he spent little time there after leaving for secondary school in Addis Ababa. In the course of his studies abroad, he had become estranged from the traditional ties and symbols of his Gondar-Amhara background. And yet now he speaks with great respect of the virtues of Gondarēs, their cultivated manner in personal relations, and their pride and wit in the use of language. The meaning of Gondar came to him almost in the manner of a revelation:

> In the midst of my studies in Western Europe I had the chance one summer to visit a number of West African countries and then to return home and spend some time in Gondar. I had not thought very highly of my people before that trip, and what I experienced was a great surprise. What I found—what we have, that I did not find in the African countries I visited—is a special sort of dignity of manner. When I talked with the elders at Gondar I was moved to tears. That is something priceless; that is a great and irreplaceable national resource.

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with the saint for whom it has been named, and personalized. The extent to which the ark is regarded as human is shown by the following remark of a peasant who looked at the picture of a church on a TAT card and explained: "When the ark has been given incense, it will be happy. . . . If this church is given a new roof, the ark will be very happy and give *ǐnjarā* to the people."

The saints and the *tābot* which represent them are the objects of much veneration and prayer. They figure so prominently in the Amhara's outlook that at times they appear to be on a par with *Egziābhēr* himself. Two differences may be noted, however. The saints do not take the initiative in interfering in human affairs, as does *Egziābhēr*, but intervene only when appealed to. Their function, moreover, is that of protecting and healing spirits; it is not their portion to administer the punishments which *Egziābhēr* inflicts on those who disobey the religious laws, though they may mete out punishment to someone who breaks a vow he has made to them.

Malevolent spirits, on the other hand, do intervene in human affairs without being invited. Of the evil spirits, the devil—known as *Diabolos*, *Sayṭān*, or *Agannent*, which are names of different spirits to the learned but counted the same in the peasant's mind—is the most powerful. He is imagined as a dark, Negroid type, the least favored sort of racial stock in Ethiopia. He dwells in deep waters, woods, and caves, and likes to roam about at noon and at midnight, especially near dirty places. Amhara avoid going near a lake or pool known to harbor the devil, for fear of being pulled in and drowned. They likewise stay away from dirty places at noon, for fear that he will make them sick. The devil brings epileptic fits. He tries to push people into fire. He also tries to harm human beings by tempting them to some misdeed—stealing, murder, getting drunk—and then have them suffer the consequences. Finally, when the human soul appears for judgment after death, he strives to gain possession of the soul and put it into the fire. Sometimes he is pictured as chewing the souls he manages to obtain.

Despite his inimical gestures toward the human race, the devil is respected as well as feared, for he has much power. Many peasants pray to him for this reason. In time of sickness some choose *Sayṭān*, rather than (or in addition to] *Giyorgis* or *Māryām*, as the one to whom they pray and make promises. On New Year's Day, Christmas, and Easter, prayers to *Sayṭān* are surreptitiously repeated in many quarters. One of these prayers runs: "My lord, bring me through the year. Guard me. If you keep me this year in peace and bring me through the year, I will give you more." Certain individuals are on especially good terms with the devil. They pray to him often, and he visits them from time to time and does favors for them; they are his "friends." When such a person dies, his son often continues the relationship.

Another kind of spirit producing ill effects is the *zār*. *Zār* spirits are of

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Besides dominating Abyssinian ritual activity, they constitute the major foci for the organization of time and space.

In the Abyssinian world view, time is not rationalized for secular purposes. Some peasants calculate the hour by the shadows on mountains, but the effort is not taken very seriously. Units of time are of little concern in the workaday world. When a man says he is going on a trip "tomorrow," everyone assumes that he means he *may* be leaving a few days later. Many appointments are made, but few are kept literally; so that the phrase *hābashā qaṭaro* ("Abyssinian appointment") has come to signify an appointment to which one comes quite late or not at all. There is little sense of time in the abstract. When an Amhara peasant is asked how long a certain trip takes, he does not reply "ten hours," but rather: "If you leave here at dawn you will arrive there before it turns dark"; and his estimate of the arrival time tends to vary according to whether or not he wants the questioner to make the trip.

Historical time is still more vaguely conceived than local time. The Amhara peasant has little sense or knowledge of history. He considers all that happened before Menelik's day as "ancient times," and more or less as an undifferentiated period. He knows very few of the earlier emperors, no historical dates, and often not even the exact year, let alone date, of his own birth. He has no idea when the church in his area was built and no interest in preserving such historical monuments or mementos as may exist in his country.

When, as often happens, anecdotes about historical figures are retold around the fireplace, the interest is not in the historical context or significance of the story but in the cleverness or heroism of the characters. Much attention is paid to genealogical lines insofar as they are relevant to potential litigation regarding rights to the use of land, but not with any concern for an objective account of historical connections. In fact, the same man may give differing accounts of the way in which he is related to a given ancestor, depending on the practical interest which underlies his recitation.[8]

With regard to his religious calendar, however, the Amhara peasant is acutely conscious of the passage of time. This concern is symbolized by a ceremony held in the churches after Mass at the beginning of each new year. A *dabtarā* stands before the people and calculates the dates for the important holidays and fasts during the coming year. Sometimes this exercise is preceded by relating the story of Demetrios, the man who after long struggles succeeded in discovering the formula by which the Orthodox calendar can be computed—so that, for example, the short fast before Lent will begin on a Monday.

The symbols of this calendar are the names of the saints. Each group of four years is named after the Four Gospels, with that of St. John (*Yohānnes*) representing leap year. The customary greeting at New Year's is of the form:

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holy ark stands in the center of the church, an area restricted to priests and deacons and consecrated to the performance of the Mass. The second circle is reserved for those few who are privileged to partake of Communion—young children and rare adults who have been married according to the church laws. The third circle is where ordinary people stand during the Mass and where the clergy sing and dance on special holidays. The church itself stands in a compound ringed by an outer wall, representing still another grade of ritual impurity. Those who have eaten before the Mass or have had sexual relations the night before are not supposed to enter the church at all, and must stand outside the outer wall during services.

This spatial pattern is likewise found in the arrangement of people out of doors. The outstanding instance of this is the traditional organization of the military camp of a *negus* or *rās*. In the center of the camp is the large, round tent of the chief, together with tents for the holy ark, high-ranking visitors, and supplies. Around this central area the commanding officers are stationed. They in turn are encircled by the tents of the cavalry. Beyond this ring, finally, is an outer circle composed of the huts of the common soldiery.

Spontaneous arrangements along this line appear during festivals. The person or persons who sing or dance are placed in the center and the spectators form a circle around them. During religious celebrations this circle consists of priests and *dabtarā*. At some distance the laymen watch from an outer circle. Here, as in the home, church, and military camp, concentric circles serve to segregate people according to their place in some hierarchical order.

Society and Human Nature

The Amhara's conceptualization of the human order lends itself as a whole to being articulated in terms of patterns of concentricity and hierarchy. The sociological component of the Amhara peasant world view consists, on the one hand, of a series of notions centered on the individual self and his progressively wider groupings; and, on the other hand, of a series of distinctions which rank persons in accord with criteria of superior and inferior qualities.

The Amhara peasant tends to have a pronounced awareness of his personal ego. The boundaries of his person and property appear firmly marked in his mind and are more important to him than the boundaries of any of his social egos. He likes to live on his own land, at a good distance from neighbors. If he lives in a homestead with other relatives, he prefers to dwell in his own separate building. The Amhara's proverbial comment on the subject is that "Home and the grave are by oneself." He is sensitive about his personal belongings, quick to defend his rights, reluctant to accept suggestions, and inflammable over insults. His conception of the admirable

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*565 156 157 man, as we shall see in more detail below, includes the quality of leaving others alone.

[577] This strong sense of self is confirmed and symbolized by two conspicuous *565 156 411 Amhara customs: carrying staves and going on trips. A staff, like a pipe, affirms the ego in two ways. As a piece of personal property right at hand, it stimulates a sense of pride of ownership; as something external yet confronting the person, it makes the ego more conscious of its bounded reality. Such sensations are daily experiences for the Amhara peasant, who is rarely separated from the staff in one form or other. When he leaves his homestead he normally carries the hard *dulā*, a potential weapon of defense that likewise affirms his ego by bolstering self-confidence in a dangerous world. He braces the *dulā* against his back as he treks along, or holds it against the [481] front of his shoulder like a rifle. Older men walk using it as a cane. A special kind of staff made of softer wood (*zang*) is carried by pious and elderly [481] men. Participants in devotional services lean on still another type of staff (*maqwāmiyā*) which is distributed in the church for that purpose.

*565 156 484 Traveling is another custom which affirms the ego, at least when one travels spontaneously and not in organized company. As the individual moves past various stimuli, his self-consciousness is heightened by the contrast between a persisting ego and a constantly changing environment. As a traveler par excellence—and a lone traveler, unless social rank requires the presence of retainers—the Amhara peasant frequently removes himself from familiar home settings and confronts an outside world. He loves to go on the road and will travel at the slightest provocation. For him a distance of two or three hours by foot is like the American's trip to the corner drugstore. Whether to visit relatives or pay respects after death, to go to market or to court, to get holy water at a distant church, or to look after land in a far away district, the Amhara peasant is on the move dozens of times each year, often for trips involving two or three days of travel.

*565 156 • 829 602 609 Because of the great emphasis on the self in Amhara experience and culture, one may for the moment say that the personal ego is the central object in the Amhara peasant's view of society. Exactly what might be meant by this statement and in what respects it needs qualification are questions that will be taken up in the concluding chapter. If it is so, certainly the next most prominent social object in his world is the circle of close ones, or *zamad*. *Zamad* refers in the first instance to consanguineal kin, and is distinguished from the category of those who are strangers, or *bā'ed*. This is perhaps the most important of all the sociological distinctions made by the Amhara: the former, *zamad*, are seen as entitled to the warmest hospitality, while toward *bā'ed* indifference and suspicion are appropriate responses.

*565 156 602 This does not mean that the kin group is a corporate entity whose interests and identity transcend that of the individual. On the contrary, the notion of

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motivated to live as long as possible: the monk wants to live longer in order to get closer to God by prayer, and the worldly man wants to live long enough to atone for his sins so that he may enter paradise. Health thus rates as one of the most important values. The expressions for greeting and farewell stress health. Most of the prayers and vows offered have to do with achieving health. Long, painful pilgrimages are made for cures, and much money is spent for the remedies of native practitioners and for amulets to ward off illness. This powerful desire for health and life operates as a lever to overcome the resistance to change.

Toward the bearers of new ideas designed to satisfy this desire for reduced morbidity and mortality, however, the peasant's stance is suspicious and unsympathetic at the outset. He regards Ethiopians who have been educated by Westerners as contaminated by alien norms and beliefs. They appear to him as Ethiopians, but also as strangers—as "black *faranj*"—with their European clothes and their unorthodox eating and smoking habits. He tends to distrust their motives, to suspect them of being out to take advantage of him in some way. And he resents their overt or implicit disparagement of his way of life, particularly his practices in so sensitive an area as sanitation.

Against such obstacles one cultural factor that serves to present the health worker as an acceptable agent of change is the Amhara peasant's deference to the man of learning. The public health worker is in a position to inherit some of the awe felt for the learned *dabtarā*, especially since the health teams operate out of centers which provide therapy as well as instruction, which gives them the benefit of association with the quasi-magical powers attributed to one who performs successful treatment. In addition, he can be aided by the Amhara peasant's personal devotion to someone who has helped him and won his confidence. Whether this devotion can be stimulated depends, in the last analysis, on the character and resourcefulness of the public health workers themselves. Those who are able to communicate in a dignified manner with the peasants, who avoid dealing with them as an inferior and backward people, who refrain from flaunting the most important local norms, and who are on good terms with local authorities and respected men, have a substantial chance of being accepted after an initial period of suspicion and alienation. Thus it was that a Gojjami peasant, asked why some of the local people were hearkening to the advice of the public health team at Dabra Marqos, explained: "We have come to realize that what you tell us to do is for our own advantage, not yours." Elsewhere in Gojjam, a similar response was the eventual issue of a more pronounced initial rejection of public health workers. In the village of Dajan doors were closed against a venereal disease team which was taking blood samples of the entire population for Kahn test analysis. Popular suspicion was voiced in a number of ways; the health workers were accused of selling blood, of being missionaries, and of otherwise trying

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not bring him to a position of rejecting man. On the contrary, man is accepted, with all his frailties, for what he is. The Amhara's patterns of life are shaped, neither to overwhelm man with guilt for his shortcomings, nor to pressure him into personal or social reform, nor to deprive his worldly existence of all enjoyment and significance; but rather to accommodate human realities and transcendent values to one another in such a way that neither is seriously compromised. He honors the value of non-violence, but indirectly, by relegating its observance to a morally differentiated role, the priest. He honors the value of marital fidelity, embodied again by the priest; but he lives comfortably, following the inclinations of the old Adam, in a status defined as technically excommunicate. He accepts the reality of hostility in human relations and adjusts to this reality by encouraging it where socially useful, curbing its socially disruptive aspects through fasting, and by channeling its expression where possible through litigation before judges, argumentation before elders, and games on festive occasions.

The Amhara peasant's outlook is both realistic and humanitarian. He does not expect political leaders to be morally pure, for he understands that all men are imperfect; *saw yallam*. He is not upset by the "selfishness" and "insincerity" of *Realpolitik*—awareness of which has sometimes been a demoralizing factor among the masses in Western countries—because *Realpolitik* is the stuff of his daily life. At the same time he seeks practical arrangements whereby human interests can be furthered and human conflicts can be contained. Insofar as this characteristic orientation of Amhara peasant culture comes to permeate the outlook of Ethiopia's modernizers—and it has never been wholly absent—it may help to reduce the intensity of those unrealistic demands and inhumanitarian impulses which are endemic in a society in transition to modernity.

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New Agents of Socialization

In Amhara society, as we have seen, the agents of primary socialization—parents and older relatives—likewise prepare the young person for adulthood, by teaching him work skills, arranging his marriage, and conditioning him to the mores of adult society. In changing Ethiopia, these traditional managers of adolescence are unable to impart the skills and values needed for a modern life. Their role as agents of secondary socialization is taken for the most part by teachers and peers in the government schools.

Schools at the post-elementary levels in Ethiopia have been staffed mainly by teachers brought under contract from foreign countries—chiefly Canada, England, India, Sweden, and the United States. Together with a growing number of Ethiopians who have studied abroad, and some graduates of Ethiopian colleges, these teachers have been the principal medium through which Ethiopian adolescents have been exposed to Western culture, not only by teaching subjects like science and English literature, and skills like drafting and stenography, but also by imparting attitudes and values important for Ethiopia's modernization.

High among these new values is that of rewarding an individual solely on the basis of performance. Although the long arm of "connections" has occasionally reached into the school system, to save, for example, the relative of some dignitary from dismissal despite substandard performance, the day-to-day operation of school life follows general standards which are applied without regard to family connections, class position, or tribal and religious affiliations.* The degree to which the students have accepted the sovereignty of universal norms is reflected in their response to the question: "In general, what will help you most to get ahead, ability or 'pull' (that is, personal contacts or influence, through family or friends)?" Nine-tenths of the students at both secondary and college levels expressed the belief that ability would help them more to get ahead.

Another modern value promoted by the school staffs is that of Ethiopian nationalism. In the elementary schools outside of Addis Ababa, pupils tend to associate chiefly with members of their own tribe and religion. In the post-elementary schools, they inevitably have considerable intercourse with members of other groups. On the basis of our sample, the ethnic composition of the post-elementary schools may be estimated as in Table 2. This ethnic pluralism would seem at first to intensify particularistic sentiments among

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 115]

* This reflects deliberate government policy. Before the occupation, sons of noblemen were segregated at Tafari Makonnen School and received preferential treatment. After the liberation, the Emperor not only discontinued this policy but took pains to eliminate favoritism in the schools to a large degree.

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Rome and the life of Abraham Lincoln than with the geography of their immediate community or the history of their own native country."[16] While a certain amount of concentration on remote matters may be essential for introducing modern adolescents to the substance and background of modern culture, it is doubtful whether they are being prepared to relate meaningfully to the society of their adulthood if that society is not made a subject for careful consideration during their schooldays.

Still another limitation on the effectiveness of the teachers stems from a quite different problem, the Ethiopian's ambivalence toward foreigners. This will be overcome with the gradual Ethiopianization of the teaching force, but that cannot be achieved for at least another generation. One area in which this problem manifests itself is linguistic nationalism. English, the official language of all post-elementary instruction, is still regarded as an outsider's tongue in Ethiopia, unlike other African countries where the European language in question serves the native peoples as a *lingua franca;* and many Ethiopians hope that the day will come when it will be replaced by Amharic as the medium of instruction.[17] Due to their ignorance of Amharic or other Ethiopian languages, foreign teachers are rarely able to gain the sort of closeness to their students that promotes the more profoundly beneficial sort of relationship. Because of this and a tradition of suspiciousness regarding foreigners, all but the radically Westernized students maintain a lingering mistrust of the teacher *qua* foreigner.

The gaps in the socialization of the modern adolescent left by the nature of his teachers and their teaching are filled to some extent by his peers. In this respect, too, modern adolescence contrasts with the traditional pattern: not only has the role of mentor and model been taken over by foreign teachers in place of the parents, but also the modern adolescent has become dependent on his peers to a degree unthinkable in traditional Amhara society.

It has been natural that the modern adolescent turn to those his own age for moral support. However much they may support the idea of his going to school as a means to a higher salary, his parents have little understanding of the new directions inherent in modern education. His foreign teachers are, at worst, preoccupied with their own narrow interests or else, at best, out of tune with the Ethiopian ethos and mentality. Older modernized Ethiopians, who should be the most sympathetic, are usually too preoccupied with their own adjustment problems to pay much attention. His schoolmates thus become his only reliable allies in the battle of growing up.

Association with age-mates is informal for the most part. There have been almost no formal youth associations or clubs in Ethiopia. The teen-age gang, with its sharp boundaries and tight controls, has scarcely come into being. Relations with peers thus takes the form of small groups of friends. More

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society: to create engineers and mechanics, doctors and nurses, economists and educators. With regard to the familiar occupations of the old order, the schools' task is to engender a new breed of practitioner—farmers versed in modern methods of agriculture, soldiers disciplined and geared to modern techniques, clergy cognizant of ecumenical Christianity, clerks who can type and take shorthand, and government officials with some modern education.

What is most revolutionary is that the schools introduce not only new subject matters for careers, but the very notion of vocation itself—of life work as

TABLE 4

SOURCES OF FUTURE SATISFACTION CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT BY STUDENTS*

Source from Which Students Expect Most Satisfaction in Life	Secondary School				College Males (per cent)	
	Males (per cent)		Females (per cent)			
	1st choice	2d choice	1st choice	2d choice	1st choice	2d choice
Career or occupation	34	12	30	9	44	17
Improvement of local community	30	27	16	36	22	28
Religious beliefs and activities	13	20	16	21	5	7
Participation in national and international affairs	10	24	13	20	8	26
Family relationships	8	10	20	9	17	14
Leisure-time, recreational activities	5	7	5	5	3	8
Number	(394)		(40)		(195)	

* Based on question 27 in the Gillespie-Allport questionnaire.

something which one *chooses,* trains for in a specific manner, and derives satisfaction from pursuing.* This orientation departs radically from the traditional expectation of inheriting the work of one's father as a matter of course. Whereas, as we have noted, the Amhara son traditionally carried on his father's work, except in rare cases where there were special reasons for not doing so, only *seven per cent* of the boys in my sample indicated that

* When asked what they expected to give most satisfaction in their lives, the students most frequently named "career or occupation" (out of six alternatives). When asked what they considered most desirable in choosing an occupation, they named "work that is really interesting" most frequently (out of six alternatives). See Tables 4 and 5.

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463 178 593 they expected to enter the same occupation as their fathers. This figure is much smaller than that obtained from a cross-cultural study of youth by James Gillespie and Gordon Allport, who found that "approximately a third of the male students in all our samples [a total of 1,168, drawn from the United States, New Zealand, South Africa, Egypt, Mexico, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and Israel] expect to enter the same occupations as their fathers, or ones closely related."[18] In part, the Ethiopian figure simply reflects the preparation for types of work which did not exist for previous generations.

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TABLE 5

OCCUPATIONAL CONDITIONS MOST DESIRED BY STUDENTS

Conditions Which Students Consider Most Desirable in Choosing Future Occupations	Secondary School				College Males (per cent)	
	Males (per cent)		Females (per cent)			
	1st choice	2d choice	1st choice	2d choice	1st choice	2d choice
Interesting work	56	24	63	17	63	18
Job security	19	26	23	11	14	31
Chance to acquire much money	12	11	3	11	10	16
Prestige	7	9	8	17	7	5
Pleasant work companions	4	26	3	30	3	27
Good boss	2	4	0	14	3	3
Number	(325)		(40)		(113)	

463 178 593 But since it also represents numerous cases where the boy's occupational interest is a traditional one—where, in other words, one finds sons of soldiers and government officials planning to become farmers, sons of farmers planning to be teachers, and sons of priests and teachers planning to be soldiers and administrators—this figure may be interpreted as indicative of a very general rejection of parental influence with respect to occupational choice.

Parents of the modern adolescents are unhappy about this diminution of their traditional authority, especially so when their children opt for some of the more "outlandish" modern occupations. Their disapproval sometimes takes the form of urging their children to quit school and get married. Often it is expressed in the form of direct criticism of the occupation in question. Nearly two-fifths of the secondary school males questioned about this indicated that their parents did not approve of the occupation they wished to enter. As

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ical wit and activism displayed by students from other countries has embarrassed their cautious dispositions.

There are three reasons for this relative lack of politicization of the Ethiopian students. One is that, having maintained her ancient independence throughout the "scramble for Africa," Ethiopia entered the twentieth century as an independent nation; and five years of Italian rule were not sufficient to shake her spirit. Ethiopian students have thus not had to participate in the anti-imperialist movement, the great school for political activism in the colonial areas.

A second factor is the deeply rooted habit of total subordination to any legitimate authority. Because of this orientation there is a persisting disposition to relegate concern for all political questions to the highest authorities. Nearly two-thirds of the secondary students and a third of the college students maintain that one should always obey the order of a superior, arguing that "obedience is a virtue," "things would not go right otherwise," and "the Bible says so."

The third reason for the almost apolitical posture of Ethiopian students has been the absence of opportunities for political expression in their country. African students from British colonies have in the past been surprised to find that their colonial situation admitted far more freedom of speech and press than Ethiopia. Teachers are expected to keep anything remotely connected with Ethiopian politics out of the classroom, and the editors are expected to keep them out of the newspapers. Nor have the students been permitted to form any kind of politically relevant associations. Even casual discussion of domestic political problems among friends has been curtailed because of the all-pervading fear of government informers.

All this has not prevented Ethiopian students from being affected to a moderate degree by the libertarian and egalitarian ideals of the West. The teaching of European history in secondary school, evaluation of students' performance without respect to class or tribal affiliation, and the exercise of electing student officers in the colleges have acted to leaven the political imagination of the students. Many of them thus ventured a degree of political criticism in their anonymous questionnaires. Forty-three per cent indicated disapproval of the existing differences between "big men" and the common people. Thirty-nine per cent were critical of the degree of control exerted by the government, of which group two-thirds felt that governmental controls are too strict (e.g., not permitting free expression), and one-third felt they were not strict enough (e.g., with respect to corruption and provincial administration).

The abortive coup d'état of December, 1960, jarred the Addis Ababa college students into an unprecedented state of political activity.[27] In response

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to the rebel leaders' appeal for a show of public support, hundreds of students staged a demonstration on behalf of the coup. Except for occasional school strikes in the past, this was the first time that Ethiopian students had ever taken part in any sort of organized political process. The novelty of the experience was reflected in the confusion on many faces as they marched through the streets of the capital, chanting a militant refrain and carrying placards that celebrated "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" and "Our Country's Peaceful Change." For some, the experience was quite unreal; it was as though they were behaving thus because that is how one is supposed to behave at a time of revolution. Not a few of the participants actually regretted the coup but went along because, as one put it: "The coup has taken place; my friends are for it; so what is one to do?"

Even so, there was a moment of genuine political engagement for all when the student demonstrators proceeded to the army headquarters with the vain plea to forestall civil violence and join the new regime installed by the Imperial Bodyguard. Though they were turned away by bayonets, that moment gave the students the intoxicating taste of direct political expression. Subsequently, the army's abrupt suppression of the rebels left these students in an awkward position. All who took part in the demonstration were required to write letters of apology to the Emperor as a condition of being readmitted to study. They did so, and returned to school; but they have never been the same again. Though on the surface they appear to have reverted to the apolitical, passive orientation of the pre-coup days, occasional oratorical contests and poetry readings have given expression to a sharpened criticism of the government and greater restlessness in the student body.

Because of the relative absence of information and discussion pertaining to domestic political questions heretofore, Ethiopian students have tended to have slightly more knowledge and interest regarding international politics. On the general question of war and peace they seem to be influenced by the high value given to warfare in traditional Ethiopia. As many as forty per cent of all the students consider war "sometimes a good thing." This sentiment is somewhat stronger among the secondary school students than among the college students, but even the latter show a higher percentage of choice for this response than any of the national groups in the Gillespie-Allport study—except perhaps Egypt. (See Table 12.)

In their attitudes toward the "big three" world powers, the Ethiopian students seem to be most favorably disposed toward the United States, secondly toward the Soviet Union, and thirdly toward Great Britain. (See Table 13.) The United States is liked because it "helps other countries," has a high standard of living, and is "advanced in civilization"; while it is disliked because of its color discrimination and its being "aggressive," "rude," "boast-

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ful," and "loud-mouthed." England is liked because it is "highly civilized" and has a "good form of government"; but it is disesteemed because of its waning power, on the one hand, and its "cunning" and "treachery," and being imperialist, on the other. Russia is admired because of its power, its achievements in science, and its rapid attainment of "civilization." It is disliked, on the other hand, for being "aggressive" and "fostering war," and because of its "bad form of government" and its "atheism."

TABLE 12

ATTITUDES OF STUDENTS FROM ETHIOPIA AND SEVEN OTHER COUNTRIES TOWARD WAR*

Country	Institution	Sex	War Is			Number
			Needless and Preventable (per cent)	A Necessary Evil (per cent)	Sometimes a Good Thing (per cent)	
Ethiopia	Secondary schools	M	46	11	43	(302)
	Secondary schools	F	46	18	36	(39)
	Colleges	M	45	20	35	(199)
Egypt	Higher Training College	M	31	34	34	(29)
	Women Teachers' Institute	F	39	35	26	(31)
France	University of Bordeaux	M	65	26	9	(105)
		F	74	26	0	(23)
Italy	Catholic University of the Sacred Heart	M	61	26	13	(39)
		F	46	44	10	(37)
Japan	Secondary school and colleges, Kyoto	M	72	16	8	(95)
		F	58	37	4	(119)
Mexico	National University of Mexico	M	51	23	26	(106)
		F	58	24	18	(103)
New Zealand	Victoria University College	M	72	16	12	(74)
		F	72	12	16	(51)
United States	Miami University	M	69	22	9	(112)
		F	64	33	3	(91)

* The Japanese data appear in Stoetzel, *op. cit.*, p. 306.
For the data on the other countries I am greatly indebted to a personal communication from Professor James Gillespie.

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In these attitudes one may note the persistence of such traditional valuations as the esteem for power, the stress on religion, and the concern about polite and dignified behavior, alongside such modernist valuations as the esteem for civilization (*sɛltanɛ*) and science. With regard to the emerging world power of Africa, however, the students have been rapidly coming to reject the traditional Abyssinian viewpoint, which looks with disdain upon the Negroid peoples of Africa as racially and culturally inferior.

As recently as a decade ago, a group of Ethiopian college students responded with ridicule and evident disdain to an illustrated ethnographic account of some East African tribes. But in the late 1950's, due to the growing

TABLE 13

ATTITUDES OF ETHIOPIAN STUDENTS TOWARD THE "BIG THREE" POWERS

Classification of Comments	England (per cent)	U.S.A. (per cent)	U.S.S.R. (per cent)
Positive.....	32	50	47
Negative.....	37	19	26
Neutral.....	11	5	6
No answer....	20	27	21
Number..	(640)	(700)	(662)

prominence of the African independence movement and the decision of the Ethiopian government to take more interest in African affairs, the pan-African sentiment began to invade the heretofore aloof highland plateau of Ethiopia. The attendance in Ethiopian colleges of students from other African countries and the growing number of pan-African meetings in Addis Ababa have promoted this trend. Consequently a number of Ethiopian students now follow with growing interest the developments in other African countries, and not a few indicated that their identification with Africa as a whole was stronger than their identification with Ethiopia. All but 8 per cent of the 700 students questioned: "What do you think about Africa?" had some response that showed concern, whether sympathy for African independence and getting rid of the Europeans (28 per cent), or sensitivity about Africa's "undeveloped" and "uncivilized" state and its need to work hard (33 per cent), or pride and confidence in Africa's resources and future (24 per cent).

So deeply rooted a sentiment as prejudice against Negroid Africans cannot quickly be willed away. It does seem, however, that the emergence of the

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*883 829 186 178 new African nations is proving to be an effective agency for reducing such prejudices among the students. The broader political identity afforded by pan-Africanism may in turn be promoting a more genuine national feeling among the younger educated Ethiopians, a feeling of solidarity that begins to encompass all the ethnic groups in their land.

*883 829 Still another sphere in which the Ethiopian students have had some room for the development of political values has been the study of history. The students were therefore asked to name the persons in Ethiopian and in world history whom they most liked and disliked, and to explain why.

The three most liked figures in Ethiopian history were Haile Selassie, mentioned by 36 per cent of the respondents; Tēwodros (30 per cent); and Menelik (16 per cent). Named much less frequently were Yohānnes (mostly by Tigre students); military heroes of Menelik's day, and of the resistance during the Italian occupation; and church figures, especially Abuna Petros (the great Orthodox martyr of the occupation).

*883 829 643 The reasons given for naming Haile Selassie include the wide variety of respects for which his reign has been praised. He is liked for uniting Ethiopia, supporting education, fighting for the country's freedom, introducing modern civilization, and generally "helping the country." The reasons given extend to expressions of very personal attachment, such as "he gives me education," "he supplies everything," and "he is my guardian."

The reasons given for liking Tēwodros or Menelik best are more circumscribed, and they are balanced by a number of other responses in which these two emperors are named as the most *disliked* persons in Ethiopian history (Tēwodros, 7 per cent; Menelik, 4 per cent). Tēwodros is liked chiefly because of his bravery and his attempt to unite the nation, while he is disliked because of his cruelty. Menelik is liked chiefly because of his defense of the country at Adowa and his efforts to modernize Ethiopia and introduce education; and he is disliked for having sold parts of the country to Europeans. Yohānnes is mentioned about the same number of times in both categories (2 per cent): positively, for his courage in battle and his Christian zeal and, negatively, for his intolerance in persecuting non-Christians.

*883 829 Līj Iyāsu (11 per cent) and Ahmad Grāñ (8 per cent) are the most disliked figures in Ethiopian history. They are associated with specific offenses: Iyāsu with being an "incompetent ruler," "encouraging Islam," and "chasing after women," and Grāñ with burning churches and massacring Christians. Three other persons in this category are Sultan Ibrahim (5 per cent), for selling the port of Assab; Dajāzmātch Haile Selassie Gugsa (4 per cent), for fighting on the side of the Italians in 1935; and Yodit (2 per cent), the legendary queen who is said to have sacked Aksum in the tenth century.

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As many as 44 per cent of the students failed to name anyone they disliked in Ethiopian history. This may be attributed in part to their meager knowledge of Ethiopian history, perhaps still more to their fear of expressing themselves honestly on such a point even in an anonymous questionnaire. But doubtless another reason was that presented by the 2 per cent of the students who wrote: "[I dislike] none; all did good." 883* 829

If the responses on Ethiopian history are analyzed with respect to the qualities or achievements of the men concerned, we find that military virtue —expressed as "brave," "defeated many enemies," or "fought for Ethiopia"— is mentioned far more often than any other (27 per cent). In second place are actions related to the modernization of Ethiopia, and the third most frequent category is that of unifying the nation. The most frequently mentioned negative categories were anti-Christian actions (burning churches, converting to Islam), cruelty, treason, and selling Ethiopian territory.

A different pattern of response is apparent in the comments on world historical personages. The interest in military prowess is still there, but not as prominent (19 per cent). It appears chiefly in the preference for Napoleon and, occasionally, for Alexander the Great. Themes of national unification and modernization occur very rarely. It is the general category of humanitarian qualities and achievements that dominates these responses (40 per cent), expressed variously as "freeing the slaves," "promoting equality," "working for peace," showing kindness or generosity, possessing wisdom or creative genius. Thus it is that Abraham Lincoln stands out as the most admired figure in world history for the Ethiopian students (22 per cent), and that following him, Napoleon, and Peter the Great, Mahatma Gandhi stands in fourth place.

Responses concerning the most disliked figure in world history are consistent with this tendency to transcend the sentiment of militant nationalism. The main charges against the villains of world history have to do with cruelty, slaughter, provocation of war (including, of course, the attack on Ethiopia), and despotism, while vices related to betraying one's nation are scarcely mentioned. The names which dominate these replies are Hitler (22 per cent), Mussolini (21 per cent), Nero (8 per cent), and Stalin (2 per cent). It appears, then, that the study of world history may have the effect of strengthening the humanitarian side of the students' political orientation by exposing them to a different set of ideals and models.

THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF MODERN ADOLESCENCE

883* 871 178

The pattern of adolescence described in this section came quickly into being and has already undergone some substantial changes. It is, in effect, the pattern of the 1950's. The educational system before and just after the occupation was, structurally, an extension of the old pattern of schooling sons of noble-

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who cultivated them being required to hand over a certain proportion of their produce every year.*

A man's "bigness," however, depended more on political authority than possession of land. It was often true in Abyssinia, as in feudal France, that the most powerful lords actually possessed relatively few estates. So long as they were not out of favor, the nobility typically were given appointments as provincial and regional governors in return for their loyalty and services.

The responsibilities of governors at all levels were diffuse. As with the emperor, combined in their persons were administrative, judicial, and ceremonial, as well as military, functions. They were obliged to collect the land tax and tithes of their subjects and transmit the proper amount to the king. They communicated imperial proclamations, announced by beating the *nagārit*, a large drum which symbolized the legitimacy of their authority. They had to judge cases of litigation that originated in their court or were appealed from lower levels. They were expected to keep disturbances caused by bandits in their area down to a reasonable minimum. They had to preside informally on the occasion of religious festivals and to provide large feasts for their followers, and occasionally for the beggars and indigents of the area.

The fact that political position was granted as a reward for military activity, like so many acres of land—or to the highest bidder, as Almeida complained[29]—suggests that the benefits of office outweighed its obligations. Indeed, public authority in Ethiopia was frankly regarded as a private possession by all concerned. The incumbent might change, but the office remained—not so much a set of obligations to fulfill in behalf of the king, or the state, let alone in behalf of the subjects—but a set of opportunities for personal aggrandizement.

The opportunities, both psychic and economic, were impressive. One was expected to avail himself of all the obsequious gestures which serve to swell the ego of an Abyssinian ruler. If so inclined, the governor could indulge his sadism ad libitum; sword, lash, and rope were, besides the *nagārit* and seal, the official insignia of a provincial ruler. He could order the peasants in his area to labor for him—to plow his lands or build his houses—as well as command them to military service. He could exact tribute from them without relief, in addition to appropriating for his family and retainers part of the

* Each land unit worked by a given tenant farmer, or *gabbār*, would be divided according to that proportion, in order to equalize the differences resulting from variation in such factors as the size of land units or the quality of soil. The proportion paid to the landlord varied with the location of the land; thus, one-half might be exacted for ordinary *dĕgā* (high) land, while in certain *qolā* (low) areas only a tenth might be required, owing to the difficulties of heat, jungle, and wild beasts.

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178 631 64 565 program not supervised by the Emperor, since any official's budding projects tend to be undone by his successor, whether because of personal vendetta, orders from the Emperor himself, or simply difference of approach. Thus has Haile Selassie been able to make sure that no one besides himself demonstrates any sort of leadership that might be attractive to the public.

At the same time his appointments have been made in such a way as to insure a balance of power—or impotence—favorable to his absolute control. By consistently appointing enemies to adjacent positions he has built in checks upon the behavior and sentiments of his higher officials. He has relied on mutual jealousies and conflicting ambitions to cause each to report anything incriminating he can find on the other. When appointees in the same branch of government have shown undue co-operation and friendliness, he has at times provoked friction between them.

In addition to the checks and balances of the *shum-shĭr* system, the Emperor has made use of an extensive intelligence system to keep watch over those in office and out. Not only the operations of the regular security depart- [625] ments of the Ministry of Interior and the police, but also some of his closer advisers have had their own personal networks, financed by moneys diverted from various government departments.

178 565 656 472 Other measures have been used to check the independence of businessmen. Money has been arbitrarily taken from them by the imposition of fines, confiscation of property, and through requests for contributions for charitable causes. A few private entrepreneurs who have been too successful have been forced into government service. Licenses have been revoked, in some cases given to foreigners rather than to prosperous Ethiopians. Dividends from commercial enterprises have been withheld, or given to others whom the Emperor favored. (Rather than appear unduly wealthy, some Ethiopian investors have preferred to use Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs as the nominal heads of their enterprises.)

178 565 554 [177] [829] Due to their relative proximity to the Emperor, their patronage powers, their wealth, and in some cases their family background, the members of the new nobility command considerable deference, particularly in Addis Ababa. Their Westernized style of life (itself modeled to a great extent on the Emperor's habits) has set new standards for modernizing Ethiopia. At the same time they are the objects of much stereotyped hostility. The people in the country, and the commoners of the towns, regard them as oppressive and unsympathetic. Their logic often runs: "The big men around the court are no good; only the Emperor is for us." The intellectuals see them as reactionary, selfish, and corrupt. The massacre of some fifteen members of the new nobility as the final act of the abortive coup d'état in 1960 was an expression of this latter judgment.

178 565 643 662 The chief advantage of the new nobility—their relative enjoyment of im-

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India (10 per cent); and by international organizations, chiefly WHO and ICAO (8 per cent). The others were financed privately, either by their families (8 per cent), or, in a few cases (3 per cent), by religious groups or business firms.

Given this variety of educational background, it is not surprising that the experience of study abroad has had a variable effect on the returnees. Their images of modernity are differently colored according to the country where they have received their higher education. Their archetypes for the modern component of language vary according to the language in which they have received their technical training.

Despite such variety—which may ultimately serve to enrich their cultural life more than to fragment it—several effects of the experience abroad appear common to nearly all the returnees. These include a radical broadening of perspective; the taste for a high standard of living; greater appreciation of political freedom; a heightened sense of Ethiopian identity; and an increase in nationalistic sentiment.

Because Ethiopian students are highly motivated to learn what goes on about them in foreign countries, their travel abroad has tended to broaden their outlooks rather than to confirm their prejudices. This expansion of perspective alters their attitude toward Ethiopia in two different ways. On the one hand, by enabling them to evaluate aspects of Ethiopian life they had previously taken for granted, it has made them more aggressively critical about conditions at home. On the other hand, it has given them a greater sense of pride about Ethiopia. They have noticed that, however advanced their host country, it had certain shortcomings of its own, a sort of observation which has tended to ease the sting of cultural inferiority inevitably felt during the stay in a more modernized society.

> Before going to the United States, I pictured it as the most perfect country on earth. We students in Ethiopia believed that everything good and beautiful comes from America. After studying there, I was disappointed in many ways. For example, I found the Americans to be hypocritical—they go to church, and don't care about religion; they talk about tolerance, and are still quite prejudiced. This was a great lesson for me. I can never be so romantic about a foreign country again, and can appreciate Ethiopia's strengths as well as its weaknesses better now.

Short travel tours sometimes had a similar effect:

> I spent several weeks in Yugoslavia. . . . And I must say—despite how backward we are here, we live much more happily than the Yugoslavs. The people themselves are wonderful—warm and generous; but their lives are miserable. That experience was really quite a surprise for me.

No matter what its shortcomings, the host country inevitably accustomed Ethiopians abroad to a higher standard of living than they had known at

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home—except for the difficulty of having to do without servants. Those students whose rural background and limited intellectual experience had led them to consider Addis Ababa as one of the most advanced cities in the world were often shocked by the comparison. No less shocking was the moral climate, which permitted one to express oneself freely and honestly. The taste for intellectual freedom was added to that of political freedom, as students whose horizons were limited by the meager intellectual fare at home came into hungry contact with authors like Marx and Freud, Dewey and Russell.

However much the Ethiopian students abroad might seek to lose themselves in the host culture, they were not permitted to do so. In the mirror of foreigners' regards, their identity as Ethiopians took clearer shape, transcending narrower tribal identifications. Questions about Ethiopia by foreigners aroused greater interest in Ethiopia's history and contemporary problems. A number of students were thus moved to dip into the literature on their country produced by travelers and scholars in the past, and some of them came to write theses and dissertations on problems related to Ethiopia's development.

All of these factors—broadening of perspective, acquaintance with a higher economic standard, less inhibited discussions, and greater self-consciousness as Ethiopians—contributed to a spirit of nationalist dedication. This spirit was confirmed or aroused in all but two groups of the returnees. One, consisting of children of some wealthy members of the new nobility, went abroad chiefly for the prestige and pleasure involved. For them the experience was an extended holiday; they were playboys more than students. The other group consists of those who were abroad for too short a time to have a complete educational experience—in some cases, for as little as three months. These students have tended to use the tour abroad chiefly as a weapon with which to lord it over their peers on return and otherwise to serve narrow personal ambitions. Those students, however, for whom study abroad entailed a more or less serious encounter with higher education and a more modernized culture normally experienced a swelling aspiration to serve their country. They returned home deeply critical of the status quo and determined to contribute substantially to the modernization of their society.

Ostensibly, the returnees have been well situated for making such a contribution. Thanks to prudent government policy since the early fifties, they have been enabled to enjoy a minimally comfortable standard of living. Given a monthly allowance from the moment they step off the plane, they have been automatically salaried at a scale based largely on the academic degree attained, with A.B.'s starting at Eth$450 a month and Ph.D.'s at Eth$700. In addition, provisions have been made for them to borrow money from the government in order to finance heavy investments like furniture or, more usually, an automobile.

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automobile. All this permits returnees to live at a standard which, while clearly inferior to what they enjoyed abroad, is well above that of all their countrymen except the higher nobility. Their income compares favorably with the prevailing monthly wages for policemen (Eth$25–$30) and district (*waradā*) governors (Eth$100), and not unfavorably with the salary earned by vice-ministers (Eth$1,000). Compared with the more sumptuous residences of the new nobility, their housing is threadbare, their staff of servants small; but usually their homes contain one or two modern appliances—a radio or phonograph, perhaps a refrigerator.

The returnees have, moreover, been shown deference from many quarters: from the modernizing sector of the public which, in its growing esteem for education, has adulated them as the most educated Ethiopians and, in the early fifties, regarded them as something of national heroes; from resident Europeans and Americans, whose perception of shared understandings with the returnees has flattered them; and from the government, which at the least has shown consistent concern for their economic security and at best has given them responsibilities and status that they would not be granted in a more modernized society without considerably more experience.

Despite such apparent advantages, however, it must be said that the returnees as a whole have so far done little either to modernize their country or even to establish themselves as a self-respecting status group. Their failure to do so has become one of the most widely discussed questions in Ethiopia in recent years, both among the more self-critical of the returnees and among critical Ethiopian and non-Ethiopian observers. Instead of being leaders of the new era, they have been little more than misfits in the old. If the central quality of the life of the new nobility has been anxiety, that of the intellectuals has been frustration. In the passionate words of one of them: "There is a wound, a boiling within each and every one of the returnees." Theirs is the frustration of modernized individuals attempting to live meaningful lives in a society that has remained essentially traditional.

The ideological aspect of this dilemma is that no synthesis of traditional and modern perspectives has yet been effected which has won the adherence of a sizable number of intellectuals and which could serve to energize their transformation of the status quo. Consensus exists only with regard to a vague sense of the inadequacy of the traditional system. There is no sense of direction. Partly this reflects deprivation due to maladjustment in personal areas, but it also represents a genuine cultural problem.

Foreign-educated Ethiopians return intellectually aware of the traditional nature of their society, but emotionally unprepared to cope with the tenacity of tradition or with the paucity of modern institutions and culture. The experience of culture shock seems greater when they return to Ethiopia than

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when they first went abroad. Then, they were taut with anticipation, eager to learn all they could and to enjoy life in a more modern society. On return, they were dismayed to find things so "backward": "I was struck at the airport by what I saw . . . the sadness in the people's faces, their undernourishment, their despair"—and plunged into a situation where their roles are ambiguous and their convictions are assaulted daily.

The perspective acquired in the course of prolonged study and residence abroad usually generates a sharp critique of Ethiopian culture on the occasion of return. In some extreme cases, Ethiopian tradition appears devoid of any value.

> Everything in our past has been based on the oppression of the masses by the feudal lords. We must overthrow it all and start from scratch.
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> There is nothing in Ethiopian traditions that I find worth while. There has been no dynamic, no development, unless prodded from the outside or above. The music and poetry are repetitive; the social order is stagnant.

Most returnees, however, stop far short of wholesale condemnation of their traditions. They become aggravated by particular customs, such as *Ishi naga* —Amharic for *mañana*—or certain requirements of etiquette. Nonetheless they have retained a basic attachment to their traditions which is re-awakened in the course of a somewhat painful re-adjustment.

> The main change since returning has been my education to be Ethiopian, to view things with the eyes of an Ethiopian. At first I expected things to be as we saw them in the United States; then I came to see the real concrete problems here, to be more understanding.
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> The ideas I acquired abroad have not changed, only my vim and vigor. One comes to see the setbacks, the need to take two steps back in order to achieve one forward. . . . In the major areas, I identify with the old culture—in such matters as politeness, reserve, hospitality, and being concerned about one's relatives and close friends. In the minor respects, no. The elders carry some of these things to extremes. If someone dies, they go and sit for three days; we go to pay our respects for half an hour. There are a hundred and one customs that fall into this category.

A few returnees even come to acquire a nostalgic interest in the things of the old culture. They become eager to have Ethiopian history and culture studied by scholars. Some have expressed a desire to take up the study of Ge'ez and *qenē*.

All such resolutions of the cultural problem are highly personal syntheses. They remain stable only so long as the individual's life is satisfactory in other

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571 829 respects. They are not anchored in a *conscience collective*. They are islands of clarity in a sea of confusion that becomes evident in remarks like the following:

> While we were in high school here, we still followed the old beliefs. We went abroad and lost them all. Nothing has yet replaced them. We have no beliefs—in any sphere—religion, social, politics.
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> We are all of us confused today. Perhaps it is that the change has come too fast. At any rate, we have lost our values. We don't know what is best for us to do.
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> I don't believe there is anyone in the entire country who knows where we are heading or where we should be heading.

This confusion is the confusion of all Ethiopia today, but because the returnees became so deeply involved in Western culture while abroad they alone have experienced it so acutely. Were they engaged in satisfying work and enmeshed in family obligations, moreover, such malaise would be reduced. Precisely in these fundamental areas, however, the returnees are typically frustrated.

571 464 The burden of the returnees' frustration in work has not been to locate employment, but to find meaningful employment. It is true that several of the foreign-educated have had to wait for months, in some cases for over a year, after returning to Ethiopia before they were actually given employment. With the establishment of a placement board for returned students in the Ministry of Education about 1955, this difficulty has been minimized. The more fundamental problem has been that the institutional system has been insufficiently modernized to make proper use of individuals who had acquired specialized training abroad. There has been great variability of experience in this regard. Many of the technical intelligentsia have found suitable positions, especially those in the fields of medicine and engineering, and have led quite productive and satisfying work lives since shortly after their return. Many others, however, have been demoralized by the experience of having to occupy simple administrative positions which anyone with a little common sense could handle, or by being saddled with purely administrative responsibilities even when initially placed in a technical job. In such circumstances they have found themselves forgetting most of what they learned while abroad and felt themselves not being used.

571 466 Even when located in work broadly commensurate with their training received abroad, the returnees have been frustrated by numerous hardships in the work situation and by the difficulties of reform. As might be expected, work facilities are generally inferior to those which the returnees became

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familiar with in more industrialized societies. Nor is there any disposition to improvise improvements with what facilities are available. Little attention is paid to the condition of offices, for example, which are normally located in dark, drab, depressing rooms. Furthermore, the operating procedures of Ethiopian administration are bound to frustrate those who have been conditioned to more rationalized systems of organization. Departments frequently operate with ex post facto budgets. Filing systems are hopelessly archaic. There is virtually no public consciousness of the importance of work *time*.

> Ethiopian persons are not geared to a timetable. I have to keep telling myself: "This is how we do it here." Seeing a ten-story building go up in a month, grass and all—that is not for here. . . . I get most annoyed when I cannot finish some matter as promised. Not wanting to reveal the name of my colleague or superior who is holding up the action, I have to make up excuses. Eventually I run out of excuses and this bothers me. . . . Sometimes I get angry and say: "I have given my word to someone, and must have the matter ready today; please sign it." And am told: "Oh, well, don't rush things so."

Work relationships have frequently exasperated the returnees. There has been little inclination to give technically competent employees proper jurisdiction over the personnel in their departments. Technically uneducated superiors have tended to make unrealistic demands—for example, requesting an immediate report on a complicated question that requires weeks to prepare. On the other hand, they have tended to assume that their age and experience are equivalent to the technical knowledge of the foreign-trained, so that technically warranted projects have been casually dismissed because they do not strike the fancy of the superior.

The returnees have not been so despondent about these conditions which, after all, could be changed—than they are about the apparent futility of trying to change them. Older employees are quick to resent alterations in the accustomed order.

> My efforts to reform are opposed by most of the men who run the [postal] system now. Some of them have been working there for forty years or so, and they want to keep things just the way they were when mail came in on camels, because they have always done it that way.

Such resistance to change at the workaday level is tacitly supported by those in the upper echelons of authority—the new nobility. In them the returnees have found their main antagonists and from them have received their most painful lacerations.

The *shamäggelotch*, or "elders," as they are termed by the intelligentsia, have by no means presented a solidary front in opposition to the young modernizers. On the contrary, the attitude of the new nobility toward the

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returnees has generally been sympathetic, and some of them have been quite helpful to individuals or groups of students during their hard pressed days as students abroad. The situation of action, however, has kept their degree of support of the returnees to a minimum. Three patterns of elder-returnee relations can be discerned: (1) The elder is concerned above all to maintain his position and, hence, to defend himself against any encroachment on his power on the part of younger people. This type has resorted to the various techniques of court politics—false rumors, libelous accusations, etc.—in order to check the influence of the returnees and have the more reformist among them transferred to less favorable positions. (2) The elder believes that if anything is to be accomplished in Ethiopia, it must be done by the educated young people, but he must be cautious in supporting the latter, for fear of getting into trouble at the palace himself if he offends any entrenched interests. Even when a returnee has been able to get the support of such a man for some reform, he may find when the time for implementation comes that his supporter has been transferred and left no commitment in writing for his successor. (3) While generally sympathetic to the returnees, this type fears the rashness and inexperience of youth and feels itself threatened by the prospect of being displaced. His apprehension is not aggressively expressed, but tends to take the form of discrediting the returnees by blaming them for every possible mistake. Whether due to the antagonism, caution, or ambivalence of the new nobility, the returnees have found relatively little effective support for their projected reforms. The ministers typically have shown them a progressive face and just as often have pursued a stagnant policy.

Vocational malaise and ideological uncertainty thus reinforce each other. The cycle of frustration is complete when we consider the marital problems of the returnee, which revolve about the difficulty of getting to know potential spouses, financial handicaps, the changing definition of marriage, and latent warfare between the sexes in the modernizing sector.

Except for a small number of returnees whose marriages have had to be arranged ones because of political considerations, the foreign-educated men, and a few of the women, are determined to choose their own spouses. Getting to know a potential spouse, however, remains a difficult matter. The traditional mores prevail with regard to social relationships between the sexes. A girl who goes out with boys is *ipso facto* presumed to have a bad character, and many of the girls in whom a returnee might be interested are not permitted to go out by their parents. There are few places where a young man and woman can go together and have privacy. Those who attempt to follow the Western custom of dating have been embarrassed.

The cost of marriage presents another obstacle. The quality of housing that a returnee aspires to for his potential family is far beyond his means in the present-day economy. Other assumed necessities—an automobile, expensive

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work, has further blurred the cleavage between returnees and locals. Finally, the returnees' growing awareness of their own "failure" has in many cases given them added sympathy toward the locals.

> The locals have as much right to live in the land as the returnees and as much duty to help the country. They should be given responsibility commensurate with what they are able to do. Doing serious work and being a leader do not require going abroad. We may find a leader in one of these kids. . . . In private life, I may not have much to do with them: I associate with a small group of friends, as does everyone; and you can't know everybody. But I have no contempt for the locals, and some of them are my best friends.
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> The locals are the real patriots around here and the ones from whom real action will come.

The locals, in turn, seem to have become less suspicious that the returnees are looking down on them. Yet, in more recent years, they have found different grounds on which to be critical of the returnees. They see the returnees as alienated from Ethiopian life, withdrawn from public action, and consumed with private concerns, instead of living up to expectations and exercising dynamic leadership in the transformation of Ethiopian society.

> The returnees know nothing about Ethiopia when they leave, and when they come back they are just like the *faranj*. We, who have not studied much, cannot see far. We know little more than to do our daily routine. But they, who have the vision, don't do anything. They borrow thousands of dollars when they return, to buy furniture, rent a home, get a car, and so on; and that is all they think about.

The dissatisfaction of many locals with the returnees has in fact increased their own self-esteem and ambition to exert leadership themselves.

In terms of the total pattern of stratification in Ethiopia, however, the factors uniting locals and returnees outweigh those separating them. Despite differences of emphasis, they share a basic estrangement from the traditional masses and elites and a deep antagonism toward the government and most of the new nobility. They are unanimous in feeling that something is dreadfully wrong in the state of Ethiopia. Frequently they cannot articulate just what they object to, or else they seize upon some flagrant social evil as the bête noire: with the locals tending to be most outspoken against the widespread prostitution, or alcoholism, or the abuses of the courts, or the inequalities of wealth; and the returnees tending to single out inefficient practices in administration, or nepotism, or corruption in high places. Above all, perhaps, they share an increasing sense of *impatience*, a sense of being smothered in an archaic and stagnant social order, which they designate so expressively with

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the Amharic phrase *ya-ḳantu weddāsē zaman*—"the era of futile flattery."

For, whatever other aspects of modern culture they have identified with, the locals and returnees are seized with the promise of its first principle: dynamism.[62] Should they join forces, among themselves and with each other, they might create the effective intelligentsia which is indispensable for realizing this dynamism in action. They would play complementary, and equally necessary, parts; the locals contributing their greater drive and closeness to traditional society, the returnees their broader perspective and skepticism toward simplistic answers and total reforms.

There are numerous obstacles to such a progressive development. Some of them represent the persistence among the intellectuals of a number of traditional pan-Abyssinian characteristics which inhibit both the exercise of creative leadership and the capacity for solidary action. The traditional context of these characteristics will be discussed in the chapters which follow. The most conspicuous obstacle, however, has been the manner in which the Ethiopian government has sought to integrate the intellectuals in the social system. This is the subject to which we now turn.

The Role of the Government

In the hierarchy of values which sustained the traditional Abyssinian social order, that of the transcendental religious orientation represented by the Orthodox Church may be said to have held the paramount position. This is the sense in which, as has so often been remarked, religion has been Abyssinia's only truly unifying factor throughout the centuries. Religious charisma transferred from foreign sanctuaries—the mythical Ark of the Covenant brought from Jerusalem and the archbishop periodically imported from Egypt—provided the ultimate source of legitimacy in the society, upholding the authority of a sacred Christian monarch, church-defending warlords, and a numerous and functionally differentiated clergy. It so penetrated the social system that the basic unit of Abyssinian civil life was in fact a religious one, the parish.

In retrospect it would seem that the most profound aspect of Haile Selassie's accomplishment has been to dislodge the transcendental religious value from highest place and to replace it with the system-integrative value of loyalty to the emperor.[63] His mission has been above all a secularizing one. To accomplish it he has had greatly to increase his political and economic resources; but insofar as his regime has been accepted, and not based exclusively on sheer power—which to some extent is certainly the case—the paramount value in Ethiopia under Haile Selassie has become loyalty to the emperor as a symbol of the whole society. The autonomous significance of the church has been reduced; its extra-Ethiopian source of charisma has been cut off, and its func-

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symbolize communal solidarities by the forthright assertion of individual claims and grievances.

In virtually every instance of a consideration of communal projects or needs that the author observed or heard of, the dominant characteristic of the discussion was a vigorous and uncompromising assertion of individual claims. If it was a question of allotting spaces in a new marketplace, each discussant was vociferating that the portion allotted to him was insufficient. If it was a question of securing more land for various communal purposes, the various property owners involved orated against contributing a square foot unless reimbursed at some preposterous figure. If it was a scene in court or a police station, everyone with any personal grievance, real or imagined, felt it perfectly proper to interrupt at any point and give vent to his opinion. If it was a question of rebuilding a ravaged church or constructing a road, personal disputations undermined all efforts toward communal action. If it was simply a ceremonial occasion, the peaceful setting one might have expected was shattered by the airing of private disputes.

> Today a new church building was dedicated. It was built to replace one that had been destroyed more than two decades ago by the Italians. People from all over the area made the journey to attend this celebration. All night long and well into the morning the priests and *dabtarā* sang and danced, accompanied as usual by sistrums and drums. Later in the morning, after the church had been officially sanctified, everyone was assembled in the open space in the church compound to listen to some verses composed in honor of the event by one of the local *bālābbāt*, a man who had been a key figure in getting the church rebuilt. He had scarcely finished reciting his poem when a woman in the audience spoke up in anger, arguing that the new church would involve more taxes and in some way would affect her property rights adversely. While he was trying to pacify her, others interrupted and began airing grievances of their own. What was to have been the climax of an occasion for the expression of communal solidarity ended as a bedlam of argument.[10]

The one area in which communal sentiments have seemed fairly strong among the Amhara has been in connection with the pursuit of outlaws. It is customary—in some Amhara districts, at least—for the local inhabitants to band together in informal posses when threatened by the presence of one or more *shĭftā*, or "outlaws." Yet even here, in his attitudes toward the *shĭftā*, the Amhara reveals an ambivalence regarding the maintenance of civil order and security.

The term *shĭftā* had, in former times, primarily a political connotation. It referred to someone who rebelled against his feudal superior and was applied only to persons of relatively high status.[11] More recently the term has been vulgarized and broadened to include any sort of outlaw in the rural areas. In

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any case the *shĭftā* is a man apart, who makes his home in uninhabited mountainous country or lowlands and lives by stealing cattle and robbing travelers. Some Amhara become *shĭftā* because of a passion for this way of life; this is particularly true of soldiers who, after a long campaign, prefer the continuation of a predatory and free existence to a return to the hard work of the fields. Others do so involuntarily, in order to escape punishment after committing some violence in the course of a personal dispute.

The attitudes of civilian Amhara toward the *shĭftā* combine fear and dislike with a strong tendency toward idealization. The *shĭftā* is feared because he is a killer; if a person happens to witness him performing some act of theft or murder, he will usually keep quiet about it for fear of reprisal. He is disliked because he lives parasitically off the productive activities of others. But the *shĭftā* is widely admired, on the other hand, because he possesses a number of qualities that are dear to the Amhara. He is reputed to be an expert singer of *shĭllalā*. He is credited with unusually handsome features because, living at the expense of others as he does, he has plenty to eat and no arduous work to wear him down. Above all he is *guabaz*, the great Amhara virtue that embodies bravery, fierceness, hardihood, and general male competence. This is symbolized by the *shĭftā*'s letting his hair grow to the proportions of a *gofarē*, the wildly thick hair style of the warrior.

The Amhara's admiration for the *shĭftā* is reminiscent of American attitudes toward the outlaw in "western" films. In the Amhara case, however, this is not balanced by a corresponding idealization of a sheriff-figure as the representative of civil order. Although a feudal lord or governor who captures some *shĭftā* in his area may be admired, this admiration will be directed to his personal qualities of bravery or cunning far more than to his capacity as an agent of "law and order." There is no feeling among the Amhara that the *shĭftā* must be captured simply because he is an outlaw. Instead, a more pragmatic approach is taken: the *shĭftā* is acknowledged as a legitimate social type and is tolerated at a distance so long as his killing does not become wanton or excessive. This approach, and what, in the idealization of the *shĭftā*, appears to be a tendency to identify with someone who openly flaunts the norms of civil society, bespeaks a relatively weak commitment to the value of civil order.

The weakness of the Amhara's attachment to symbols of local community is paralleled by his parochialism with respect to more inclusive levels of community. This parochialism is manifest in diverse ways in the different social strata. Among the peasantry it appears, for example, as an aversion to arranging marriages and permitting land to pass to an Amhara from a different province. Among the clergy it has been expressed in terms of those regionally based doctrinal differences which have disrupted the church for many centuries. Among the nobility it has taken the form of incessant politi-

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cal animosities which have weakened the nobility as a status group both in relation to the emperor and in relation to foreign countries. Another respect in which Amhara parochialism has been expressed is the addiction to regional stereotypes, according to which the Tigrean has been depicted as flighty, irresponsible, and "dry"; the Gondarē as intolerably proud; the Gojjami as sly and treacherous; and the Shoan as calculating and untrustworthy. Despite its long history as a nation, Ethiopia probably never experienced more than the dimmest stirrings of a truly national sentiment among its people; and more than once in the past century have regional lords strengthened the hand of European powers in Ethiopia by seeking their help in the combat against other local rulers.

Self and Others

In addition to considering the extent to which the members of a society identify with the needs and symbols of their more inclusive collectivities, one may also define the individualistic disposition on the dimension of personal interaction. Egoism contrasts, in other words, not only with the disposition to perceive collective purposes as one's own, but also with the disposition to seek solidarity and mutuality in face-to-face relations.

This aspect of egoism/solidarism is studied by surveying the more important forms of interaction that appear in a given society. In the survey of elementary social behavior among the Amhara now to be reported, two criteria were used to establish the importance of any given form: (1) the frequency with which it was observed, and (2) the extent to which it was stylized or "institutionalized." These criteria were not embodied in any systematic observational procedures; the only control over the observer's bias here is my own deliberate effort to present a balanced and accurate picture.

We may begin by considering the more solidaristic forms. Interaction among the Amhara is characterized, first of all, by a sort of *sensuous camaraderie*. The Amhara enjoy bodily contact. Members of the same sex customarily hold one another's hands for long periods while conversing, or embrace one another in casual fellowship. Crowds of commoners cheerfully huddle close to one another on the floor through the night when they have assembled for some social function and cannot return home the same day. Relatives and companions of the same sex incline to sleep in one another's arms, at least in the chillier altitudes.

Both their style of dress and their manner of eating give the Amhara a ready way to express this comradely feeling. Their untailored cotton or wool cloth easily adapts itself to being shared. Except perhaps for individuals of high social status, the typical Amhara is ready to use his toga as a blanket-wrap for both himself and another whom he may scarcely know.

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

A similar spirit is observed in Amhara commensality. Meals are customarily eaten from a common *ĭnjarā* basket. The sauce is ladled onto the center of the *ĭnjarā*, and is consumed ensemble by those sitting around the basket as they dip into it with pieces of *ĭnjarā* broken off from the edges. Traditional Amhara scoff at what they regard as the excessively individualistic Western custom of sitting each person down to a separate place at the table and thus depriving the meal hour of what they feel should be its basically communal tone.

At a more formal level of interaction this disposition is expressed in the form of *hospitality*. Amhara hospitality is luxuriously attentive and thoughtful. For example, if there is foreknowledge of a guest's arrival, he is awaited at some distance from his destination and escorted with much to-do into the home. His mule is at once unsaddled and given to feed. The guest is given a place of honor in the home, and a glass of *ṭallā* is immediately brought for him. Amhara etiquette prescribes, moreover, that a glass is not properly filled unless it overflows; and it is repeatedly filled to overflowing whenever the guest has drunk some portion of the beverage. As a gratuitous gesture of good faith, the host—or his wife, or servant—tastes some of the beverage first, a sign that no "medicine" has been added. Before long the wicker table is produced, and the guest and his party are served copiously—no matter what time of day they arrive (unless, of course, it is a fasting day). When the guest has eaten to satisfaction, the host will insist that he eat some more, by repeatedly issuing injunctions like *tegābazu* ("Help yourselves!"), *moḳar* ("Try!"), or *āfar sehon* ("If I become dust!"—i.e., "If you do not eat you will be condemning me to death"). The Amhara host is also likely to insist that his guest spend the night. The guest's feet will be washed, and the host's bed will be given to him, or long grass will be cut for bedding on the floor. At the time of farewell, the host and his attendants follow the guest and his party a good distance along the road. The guest continually cries, "Return! Return!" and the host agrees but continues to serve as escort.

Such hospitality is not wantonly bestowed upon the casual wayfarer. Normally it is reserved for those who qualify as worthy guests: relatives, friends, or persons of high rank. Nonetheless, there does exist among the Amhara some feeling that even the unknown stranger should be shown hospitality, for he is *ya-egziābhĕr engedā* ("a guest of God"). Travelers are generally assured that somebody somewhere will show them hospitality; there are no inns in traditional Ethiopia, for it is considered wrong to exchange food and lodging for money.

Related to this pattern of hospitality is a delicate sense of *respect* that the Amhara displays toward all comers; often, even toward his enemies. When two Amhara pass each other anywhere, they are expected to bow slightly and say: "How did you pass the night?" or "How did you spend the day?" If they

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19. Thus, an eighth-grade student in Manz explained the popularity of the Jimma Agricultural School by saying, "The boys all want to go there because it is run by the Americans, and a school run by Americans means that everything is done right—food and clothes are properly distributed, and so on."
20. Shack, *op. cit.*, p. 417.
21. In response to a question on their attitudes toward the priests, sixty juniors and seniors of Tafari Makonnen Secondary School replied as follows (1959): 40 per cent were unequivocally proclerical; 22 per cent were ambivalent, expressing awareness of both good and bad elements in the clergy; and 18 per cent were primarily anticlerical, calling the priests "incompetent," "opposed to modernization," and "not supported by the people." (The rest were no answers or noncommittal.)
22. Edith Lord, "The Impact of Education on Non-scientific Beliefs in Ethiopia," *Journal of Social Psychology*, XLVII, Second-Half (May, 1958), 339–54.
23. Cf. Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (rev. ed.; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954), chaps. vii and xiv.
24. Cf. chap. iii, p. 89, and note 19.
25. Lord, "The Impact of Education on Non-Scientific Beliefs," typescript version, pp. 6–7.
26. A sophisticated expression of this approach to Ethiopian painting has been published by an Ethiopian student in France. Cf. Berhanu Abbaba, "La peinture éthiopienne: point de vue d'un Éthiopien," *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, II, No. 1 (1961), 160–65.
27. For a brief account of this historic event cf. Lipsky *et al.*, *Ethiopia* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1962), pp. 210–12.
28. Edgar Z. Friedenberg, *The Vanishing Adolescent* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959).
29. *Diagnosis of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), chap. iii.

CHAPTER 5: *The Old and New Elites*

1. C. Conti Rossini, "La regalità sacra in Abissinia," *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni*, XXI (1948), 12–31.
2. A. Vasiliev, "Justin I (518–527) and Abyssinia," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XXXIII (1933), 67–77; *Justin the First* (Harvard, 1950), pp. 299–302.
3. A. Caquot, "La royauté sacrale en Éthiopie," *Annales d'Éthiopie*, II (1957), 205–19.
4. F. Alvares, *The Prester John of the Indies*, ed. C. F. Beckingham and G. Huntingford (2 vols.; Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1961), I, 122.
5. "The Chronicle of the Emperor Zara Yaqob," *Ethiopia Observer*, V, No. 2 (1961), 153.
6. J. Varenbergh, *Studien zur äthiopischen Reichsordnung* (Strassburg, 1916), p. 3.
7. James Bruce, *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile* (5 vols.; Edinburgh, 1790), III, 237.

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113 Conceptions of Time and Space in the Amhara World View," *Atti del convegno internazionale di studi etiopici* (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1960), pp. 223–28.

8. Cf. Allan Hoben, "The Role of Ambilineal Descent Groups in Gojjam Amhara Social Organization" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1963), pp. 140 ff.
9. *Ibid.*, chaps. ii and v.
10. On Amhara attitudes toward nationhood cf. D. Levine, "Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism," *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. L. Pye and S. Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
11. Messing, "The Highland-Plateau Amhara," pp. 63–67, presents a detailed analysis of the ethnic hierarchy in Ethiopia "as it exists in the minds of most Amhara." Briefly summarized, this hierarchy consists, in order of descending status, of the (Christian) Tigre; Christianized Galla; Muslim and pagan Galla, and other sedentary Cushitic-speaking peoples who were self-governing prior to Menelik's conquests (Kaffa, Wollamo, etc.); peoples identified chiefly as manual laborers (Falasha, Gurage); and occupational hunters, pastoral nomads, and Negroid ex-slaves.

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113 12. This subject is discussed in greater detail in D. Levine, "Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism," *op. cit.*

13. Marcel Griaule, "Le travail en Abyssinie," *Revue internationale du travail*, XXIII (February, 1931), p. 8.
14. This ideal is discussed at greater length in D. Levine, "The Concept of Masculinity in Ethiopian Culture" (paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Symposium of the Committee on Human Development, The University of Chicago, May 11, 1963: to be published in the *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*).
15. *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), chap. iv; and *The Little Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), chap. vi.
16. Cf. Messing, "The Highland-Plateau Amhara," p. 540.

00017 17. Harris observed that "the Abyssinian scribe does not hold the pen of a ready writer; and the dilatory management of his awkward implement is attended with gestures and attitudes the most ridiculous." Also, "Few of the priesthood understand the art of writing, and all regard the exercise of the pen as shameful and derogatory." *The Highlands of Ethiopia* (3 vols.; London, 1844), III, 15, 182.

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18. Cf. Benjamin Paul, ed. *Health, Culture, and Community* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955).
19. See a series of articles beginning in the *Ethiopian Herald*, Addis Ababa, June 27, 1960: "Let the Victim Speak of the Magnitude of Ethiopian Medicine."

000 20. A long-term study of this and related problems is currently being carried out under the supervision of the US/AID Public Health Section in Ethiopia.

113 21. For general analyses of the nature of political life which support this assertion, cf. Edward Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956);